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INTRODUCTION

In most modern bankruptcy cases under Chapter 11, creditors
and sophisticated investors trade in the claims against the debtor.
Treating these claims like securities, various parties-including creditors serving on creditors' committees-buy and sell bank debts, trade
debts, tort claims, and other obligations the debtor incurred in the
course of business. Amid an unstable judicial and academic consensus
that the securities laws do not apply to trading in these claims, courts
have developed a set of bankruptcy-specific remedies for abusive
claims trading, including for situations that resemble insider trading.
Courts generally allow creditors on committees to trade claims as long
as they have in place a "Chinese Wall"' separating their committee
activity from their trading activity. But although Chinese Walls effectively prevent harms arising from violations of fiduciary duty, they are
inappropriate guards against harms arising from insider trading itself.
The crucial distinction between liability based on fiduciary duties and
liability based on insider trading proper means that courts should accept the use of "big boy letters"-essentially nonreliance letters in
which each party agrees to accept the possibility that the other has
undisclosed inside information relevant to the trade-as an independent defense to insider trading liability.
This Comment thus argues that, together, big boy letters and Chinese Walls respond to the harms that animate the bankruptcy remedies. Chinese Walls address the harms involved in fiduciary duty liability, though they have certain practical deficiencies. Big boy letters, for
their part, guard against the harms associated with insider trading liability. This core insight-that Chinese Walls address one source of
liability and big boy letters the other-suggests that bankruptcy courts
should incorporate Chinese Walls and big boy letters into their claims
trading regulations, and thereby realign the remedies for insider
claims trading along the division between fiduciary duty liability and
insider trading liability proper.
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I. A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF CLAIMS TRADING,
CHINESE WALLS, AND BIG BOY LETrERS

When an entity files for Chapter 11, typically its creditors hold
various claims against it that exceed the debtor's assets.2 These claims
against the debtor can include secured and unsecured loans, trade
debts, tort or contract claims, wage obligations to employees, and

other sorts of obligations incurred in the course of business. The
length, complication, and uncertainty of a bankruptcy case mean that
a given claim could end up being worth more or less when the debtor
finally reorganizes than it might appear at various points during the
case. Some creditors, preferring not to take the risk that a claim's value
will fall, may want to sell their claims to others who do. They can do so
because the claims at issue are normally assignable to third parties.3

Thus it happens that in bankruptcy, sophisticated investors routinely bundle, buy, and sell these same claims several times over, often
at steep discounts from their face values.' This "claims trading"' can

give the original holder a quick and certain return while providing an
investment vehicle to those with a high tolerance for risk. In addition,

because claims against a debtor give the claimant a voice in the reorganization plan, some investors acquire claims in order to acquire the
debtor itself.6 Whether for speculation or for acquisition, trading in
2
The short version of the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim" is a "right to payment."
11 USC § 101(5) (2000 & Supp 2005). This is a broad definition that includes stocks and other
securities. For simplicity, this Comment will use "claimant" and "creditor" interchangeably, and
"claim" and "debt" interchangeably. In addition, for reasons that will become apparent below,

this Comment uses "claim" to mean only forms of debt to which the securities laws do not now,
but might in the future, apply. Most of this trading involves bank debt because the Bankruptcy
Code definition of "security" explicitly excludes trade debt. See 11 USC § 101(49)(B)(vii) (2000
& Supp 2005) (stating that "security" does not include "debt or evidence of indebtedness for
goods sold and delivered or services rendered").
3
See, for example, In re PleasantHill Partners,LP, 163 BR 388, 391 n 5 (Bankr ND Ga
1994) (explaining that FRBP 3001(e) outlines the procedure for transfer, typically through sale
and purchase, of bankruptcy claims).
4
See Harold S. Novikoff and Barbara Kohl Gerschwer, Selected Topics in Claims Trading,
in Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations 191, 195 (ALI-ABA 2003) ("The record number of
bankruptcies during the past several years has brought with it an active market in claims trading."). See also Chaim J.Fortgang and Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control
of Corporationsin Chapter11,12 Cardozo L Rev 1, 2-3 (1990) (explaining that there is an active
market for investors trading claims against corporations in Chapter 11).
5
If a claim is a "right to payment," 11 USC § 101(5), "claims trading" occurs when investors buy or sell that right. In bankruptcy, however, the right usually sells for less than face value
because at the end of bankruptcy the claimants against the debtor may not-indeed probably
will not-receive all the debtor owes them. The debtor's inability to pay back its creditors, after
all, is usually why it filed for bankruptcy (the claims exceed the assets). This Comment uses "claims
trading" to refer only to trading in claims that are currently not subject to the securities laws.
6
The basic idea of Chapter 11 is to provide a coherent framework for those with claims
against the debtor to get a partial return on their claims, while reorganizing the debtor's capital
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this kind of distressed debt has increased dramatically since the middle of the 1980s. Indeed, investors have formed distressed debt funds,

some with assets of over a billion dollars.'
As claims trading has developed into a big business in American
bankruptcies, it has posed a number of difficult legal questions. For

starters, the more liquid and active the market in bankruptcy claims,
the more claims begin to look like securities.' Indeed, whether or not
such claims fall under the definition of securities under current securities case law remains an open question.' The similarities between
claims trading and securities trading raise the question of why courts
structure so that it can pay its debts as a going concern, insofar as that is possible given economic
realities. A reorganization plan does this. The creditors or claimants holding a certain threshold
percentage of the value of the total claims against the debtor can control whether the reorganization plan is accepted. See 11 USC § 1126(c) (2000). Frequently, part of a reorganization plan
involves exchanging the debt a creditor holds for stock in the reorganized debtor. Thus acquiring
claims against the debtor may give a creditor the chance to influence the plan so that its claims
exchange for stock. See Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds, 9 Collier on Bankruptcy
1.03[41 at 1-55 to -56 (Matthew Bender 15th rev ed 2007). See also Michael H. Whitaker, Note,
Regulating Claims Trading in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies:A Proposalfor Mandatory Disclosure, 3
Cornell J L & Pub Policy 303, 311 (1994) (observing that some traders acquire large blocks of
claims to gain control by either blocking plans that do not give the trader a favorable equity
stake or independently approving plans that do give the trader a favorable equity stake).
7
See Robert D. Drain and Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the
FederalSecurities Laws?, 10 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 569, 569 n 1 (2002) ("Commentators offer
anecdotal evidence of a [bankruptcy claims] market in the billions of dollars.").
8 For more discussion of this basic point, see notes 34-36 and accompanying text. See also
Drain and Schwartz, 10 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 620 (cited in note 7) (observing that claims
traders, as voluntary investors in claims for profit, "have developed, if not a formal exchange, at
least enough trading activity to create an informal market in distressed claims" and suggesting
that this voluntary, active market in investment instruments resembles the securities markets).
Again, securities are themselves claims against the debtor but this Comment uses "security" to
denote those claims, like traditional bonds and stocks, to which the securities laws uncontroversially apply, and "claims" to denote those claims over which there is controversy regarding
whether the securities laws apply to trading in them.
9 See generally, for example, Richard G. Mason and Gregory E. Pessin, Legal Issues in
Claims Trading (Papers of the 32nd Annual Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization, NYU School of Law, Sept 27-29, 2006) (discussing the importance of contemporary developments to the question of whether debt trading should be regulated under securities law);
Drain and Schwartz, 10 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 569 (cited in note 7) (arguing against treating
bankruptcy claims as securities except in limited circumstances); Thomas Donegan, Note, Covering the "Security Blanket": Regulating Bankruptcy Claims and Claim-ParticipationsTrading
under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bankr Dev J 381 (1998) (arguing for treating bankruptcy
claims as securities); James D. Prendergast, Applying Federal Securities Laws to the Trading of
Claims in Bankruptcy, 3 Faulkner & Gray's Bankr L Rev 9 (1992) (same); Anthony Michael
Sabino, No Security in Bankruptcy: The Argument againstApplying the FederalSecurities Laws to
the Trading of Claims of Chapter 11 Debtors, 24 Pac L J 109 (1992) (reviewing legal developments in bankruptcy and concluding that bankruptcy claims are not securities); Fortgang and
Mayer, 12 Cardozo L Rev 1 (cited in note 4) (same). Despite this academic debate, the general
view among bankruptcy judges and practitioners is that claims are not securities. See Alan N.
Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, 6 Collier Bankruptcy PracticeGuide 94.08 at 94-127 (Matthew
Bender 2007) ("The securities laws do not, . . . as interpreted by recent decisions, define trade
claims in bankruptcy as 'securities."').
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do not apply the securities laws to trading in bankruptcy claims. The
debate over this question is important background, but this Comment
does not join it, except to note that for most commentators the nonapplication of the securities laws to claims trading hinges in part on
the ability of bankruptcy courts to develop sensible rules regulating
claims trading-rules that can address, in the particular context of
bankruptcy, the problems the securities laws address elsewhere.
One situation where this challenge arises involves insider trading,
which this Comment defines as trading with material nonpublic information. ' In a bankruptcy, some of the parties trading the debtor's
securities or other claims may have inside information about the likely
prospects of the debtor, information relevant to the value of both the
securities and other claims. The SEC's Rule 10b-51' and the case law
interpreting it already govern insider trading in securities. Alongside
the securities laws, bankruptcy courts have begun to develop remedies
from the Bankruptcy Code'2 ("the Code") and precedent to govern
insider trading in claims." If one assumes that the securities laws do
not apply to claims trading, one can analyze this alternative regulatory
regime to determine how it might adapt to new investor behavior in
productive and conceptually consistent ways. This background regime
("the bankruptcy remedies" or "claims trading remedies") is still
evolving. If it is to be a sensible alternative to securities law in this
context, that regime must successfully address the problems that insider trading poses inside of bankruptcy. This Comment focuses on
insider trading by members of creditors' committees and examines
how claims trading regulations in this particular context might evolve
to account for some new investor behaviors.
The creditor who sits on a creditors' committee, then, is the central character of this story.. Because creditors on such committees

10 As with "claims," one must be careful here with terminology. The Bankruptcy Code has
a specific definition of "insider," 11 USC § 101(31) (2000 & Supp 2005), but this Comment defines "insider trading" simply as trading on material nonpublic information and "insider" as one
who trades on such information.
n 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2000).
12 11 USC § 101 et seq (2000 & Supp 2005).
13 See, for example, Citicorp Venture Capital,Ltd v Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160 F3d 982, 991-92 (3d Cir 1998) (granting equitable subordination where a
fiduciary purchased notes at a discount based on inside information to make a profit and influence
the reorganization plan for its own gain without disclosing this information to any third parties).
14 Creditors' committees are groups of creditors who work together to negotiate with the
debtor regarding its reorganization. See 11 USC § 1103(c). Although any group of creditors can
do this informally, § 1102 typically requires the appointment of an official creditors' committee
consisting of the seven largest creditors. See 11 USC § 1102(a)(1), (b)(1). In practice, this committee often includes a representative sampling of the general creditors, whether or not they are
among the top seven. See Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy 21-22 (Foundation 4th ed
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negotiate with the debtor frequently, they often have material, nonpublic information about the debtor. Creditors on official committees
are always fiduciaries for the creditors they represent;" those on unofficial committees may be fiduciaries, depending on the circumstances."

Some of bankruptcy's claims trading regulations aim to compensate
those harmed when creditors on committees trade claims on inside
information. "
In response, some institutional investors who were creditors of
the debtor and who wanted to trade in the debtor's securities or
claims started asking courts to issue "trading orders," allowing them to
trade provided they meet certain requirements.'8 These requirements
are collectively known as a Chinese Wall, and they separate the trading activity of a creditor from its committee activity. This prevents the
traders from capitalizing on inside information and ensures that the
committee members represent their constituents without any conflict
of interest. 9 Courts have allowed these Chinese Walls to act as an ex2 °
ante defense, immunizing claims trading creditors from some liability.
Into this quickly developing scene has stepped a new figure: the
big boy. As courts continue to struggle with how to address claims
trading, sophisticated investors with potential inside information have
developed their own strategy. This is the new trading behavior referred to above. Put briefly, an insider admits that he might have inside information and another party acknowledges this admission and
agrees not to rely on the insider's representations, to accept the risk,
and to do the trade anyway. The idea is that all the parties are adults
and can make their own judgments. The parties memorialize their
agreement in a document fittingly called a big boy letter.2'
2006). Its purpose is to represent the interests of a certain class of creditors, usually the general
unsecured creditors. Id.
15 Novikoff and Gerschwer, Selected Topics in Claims Trading at 195 (cited in note 4) (stating that committee members are not, however, necessarily fiduciaries to the debtor and citing
Woods v NationalBank and Trust Co of Chicago, 312 US 262,268-69 (1941) in support).
16 Ralph R. Mabey, The Legal Consequences for a Claims Trader Who Is a Fiduciary45,
46-49 (Papers of the 32nd Annual Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization, NYU
School of Law, Sept 27-29,2006) (explaining who qualifies as a "fiduciary" and distinguishing the
duties of ad hoc committee members from those of official committee members).
17 See Part IV.
18 For a detailed discussion of these requirements, see Part V.
19 Maintaining a Chinese Wall is not costless for a firm; it entails certain inefficiencies and
is not always feasible. See text accompanying notes 128-30.
20
See, for example, In re FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc, 1991 WL 79143, *2 (Bankr SD
Ohio) ("Fidelity will not be violating its fiduciary duties as a committee member ... provided
that Fidelity employs an appropriate information blocking device or 'Chinese Wall."').
21 A typical big boy letter might include the following representations by the buyer: that it
is financially sophisticated; that it knows the insider may possess material nonpublic information;
that it is not relying on any representations that the big boy letter does not contain; and that it is
waiving all claims against the insider arising from the trade. Stephen E. Older and Joshua M.
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To figure out the differing roles of these two investor toolsChinese Walls and big boy letters-is the challenge at hand. The next
Part begins with a review of the legal debate about whether the securities laws should apply to claims trading and what justifies their current nonapplication. Part III summarizes the law regulating fiduciary
trading on inside information, of which trading by committee members is a type. It highlights the critical distinction at the heart of this
Comment between liability arising from the law of fiduciaries and
liability arising from the law of insider trading. Part IV turns to specifics. It analyzes the parallel bankruptcy remedies for claims trading
violations to explain how the principal harms that bankruptcy courts
fear from the practice map onto these two sources of liability. These
are the background rules that would apply in the absence of prophylactic measures like Chinese Walls. Part V then lays out the core argument of this Comment. Part V.A discusses Chinese Walls and outlines the class of harms they can stop and the sources of liability from
which they can immunize a committee member. Part VB does the
same analysis for big boy letters. Part VC compares big boy letters
with Chinese Walls in this respect. Here the Comment presents its
thesis: courts should treat Chinese Walls as a defense to one source of
liability (fiduciary duty liability) and big boy letters as a defense to the
other source (insider trading liability).22 Even though courts and the
SEC have not always clearly distinguished between these two sources
of liability, the harms they worry about and the remedies they impose
nonetheless illustrate the difference.
Part VI connects the core argument to the larger field of relevant
law by asking what big boy letters and Chinese Walls tell us about
Rule 10b-5 liability outside of bankruptcy. The answer, merely traced
here, suggests a new line of inquiry. For if big boy letters and Chinese
Walls apply to two separate legal harms-insider trading and the
breach of fiduciary duties, respectively-requiring distinct remedies,
Bloomstein, Cutting "Big Boys" Down to Size, 38 Mergers & Acquisitions 38, 39 (2003) (noting
that courts have not reached a clear decision on whether the letters are enforceable). For a current sample of the big boy language used in distressed debt trading documents, see Loan Syndications and Trading Association, User's Guide for LSTA DistressedDebt Trading Documentation
§ IV.C.2.b.20 at 19-20 (2007), online at http://www.lsta.orglWorkArea/downloadasset.aspx?id=1 114
(visited Jan 12,2008).
22
See Part III for a detailed discussion of the difference between these two sources of
liability. Although insider trading liability has some basis in the common law, see note 49 and
accompanying text, the modem law is a creature of federal statute, whereas fiduciary duties
derive from state common law. In its enforcement of the insider trading regulations, however, the
SEC and courts have not kept this distinction clear. See, for example, United States v O'Hagan,
521 US 642, 652-53 (1997) (expanding insider trading liability to include a "misappropriation"
theory under which, even if he has no duty to the party with whom he trades, an insider with a
fiduciary duty to his information's source can be liable to that source under Rule 10b-5).
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then the law of securities and corporate governance outside of bankruptcy should also treat these harms separately.
II. THE BACKGROUND DEBATE: DO THE SECURITIES LAWS
APPLY TO CLAIMS TRADING?

The debate over whether securities laws apply to claims trading
casts a long shadow over claims trading jurisprudence. For it turns out

that among the compelling reasons not to apply the securities laws to
claims trading, the foremost is the presence of an alternative regulatory regime: the bankruptcy remedies. If that regime does not work
well, then it cannot, as it now does, justify the current consensus that
the securities laws do not apply to claims trading.

In general, the Supreme Court determines when an instrument is
a security by looking to "the economic substance of the transaction,
rather than just to its form." Indeed, "[t]he fundamental purpose undergirding the Securities Acts," Supreme Court opinions have repeatedly stated, "is to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated
securities market."2 According to the Court, Congress did not want a
rigid definition that would be easy for traders to avoid by structuring
their transactions around it because the purpose of the securities laws
was "to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by
whatever name they are called."'
The Securities and Exchange Acts define "security" by a lengthy
list of some rather ambiguous terms, ambiguity that may reflect Con-

gress's preference for flexibility.2 "[N]ote[s]"-likely to accurately

23 Landreth Timber Co v Landreth, 471 US 681, 688 (1985) (holding that a sale of stock
amounting to the entire business is regulated by securities law).
24
Reves v Ernst & Young, 494 US 56, 60 (1990) (discussing whether a promissory note is a
security), quoting United Housing Foundation,Inc v Forman,421 US 837,849 (1975) (stating that
securities laws are focused on preventing fraud and protecting the interests of investors).
25 Reves, 494 US at 61. Justice Marshall followed precedent in making clear that "Congress
did not, however, intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud." Id, quoting Marine
Bank v Weaver, 455 US 551, 559 (1982) (holding that a certificate of deposit is not a security
regulated by federal securities law).
26
Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), 48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15 USC
§ 77a et seq (2000 & Supp 2002); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 48 Stat 881,
codified as amended at 15 USCA § 78a et seq (2007).
27
The definitions from the Securities and Exchange Acts are very long and appear here
only in relevant part. The Securities Act states: "The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement,... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security."' 15 USC § 77b(a)(1). The Exchange Act provides: "The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, ... or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a 'security."' 15 USC § 78c(a)(10) (2000).
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encompass the claims traded in bankruptcy-is one of these ambiguous terms. Reves v Ernst & Young" supplied the governing test for
whether a note is a security, under which a note is presumed to be a
security unless it bears a "family resemblance" to certain types of
notes commonly understood not to count as securities.2 A court must
determine the resemblance with reference to four factors: (1) whether
the purpose of the transaction centers on profitable investment, the

facilitation of capital, or some other commercial purpose; (2) whether
the "plan of distribution" involves "common trading for speculation or
investment"; (3) the "reasonable expectations of the investing public";
and (4) "the existence of another regulatory scheme."-"
Commentators have applied Reves to bankruptcy claims and

come up with opposite, but equally supported, results. 31 Courts have
Commentators once thought that the absence of "evidence of indebtedness" from the Exchange Act's definition of security was significant (especially, for present purposes, if claims were
to count as evidences of indebtedness). But the Supreme Court definitively precluded such
thinking when it reaffirmed in 1990 that the definitions in the Acts are "virtually identical" and
that "the coverage of the two Acts may be considered the same." Reves, 494 US at 61 n 1. But see
Resnick and Sommer, 6 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide 94.08[1] at 94-129 (cited in note 9)
(arguing that the absence of "evidence of indebtedness" from the Exchange Act might mean that
Rule lOb-5 does not regulate trade claims even if the Securities Act does). In any case, this Comment takes "note[s]" as the most likely term (appearing in both definitions) to apply to claims.
As mentioned in note 2, the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "security" explicitly leaves out
trade claims.
28 494 US 56 (1990).
29
See id at 65 (reasoning that not all notes are securities because Congress did not intend
to create a general cause of action for fraud). The notes recognized as not being securities are: a
note delivered in consumer financing; a note secured by a home mortgage; a short-term note
secured by a lien on a small business; a note evidencing a "character loan" to a bank customer; a
short-term note secured by an assignment of accounts receivable; a note finalizing an openaccount debt incurred in the ordinary course of business; or a note evidencing loans from a
commercial bank for current operations. Id.
30
Id at 66-67 (reasoning that a transaction based upon profitable investment supports
treatment as a security, but that another regulatory scheme may significantly reduce the risk of
the instrument and render securities regulation unnecessary).
31
See, for example, the capable demonstration of possible opposing positions in Drain and
Schwartz, 10 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 619 (cited in note 7) (arguing for a context-dependent
analysis because the Reves test can go both ways for bankruptcy claims). One could credibly take
either side. Donegan, Prendergast, and Sabino engage in the most straightforward debate over
the application of the Reves test. They assume that the moment a claim would become a security
is the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See Donegan, Note, 14 Bankr Dev J at 403 (cited in note
9) (implying that both the original claimant and any subsequent purchaser of the claim meet the
passive investment requirement for securities regulation); Prendergast, 3 Faulkner & Gray's
Bankr L Rev at 13-14 (cited in note 9) (noting that all the criteria in Reves seem to argue for
application of the federal securities laws in the claims trading environment); Sabino, 24 Pac L J
at 119-22 (cited in note 9) (arguing that a claim should not turn into a security once a bankruptcy petition is filed). For an important weakness of their focus on the time of the petition, see
note 37. By contrast Fortgang and Mayer, the first and probably most thorough commentators on
this question and on claims trading in general, point to the resale of the claim as the time of its
possible transformation into a security. Fortgang and Mayer, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 52-53 (cited in
note 4) ("The trade claim in bankruptcy would not be the first instrument which is not a security
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almost never addressed the question directly, and the existing cases
are out of date and unhelpful.32 Though a mechanical application does

not provide a clear answer, some recent lower court opinions (addressing instruments similar to claims) and the commentary suggest

the following basic principles."
The securities laws are designed to regulate investments and pre-

vent abuses in their trading, including abuses of inside information."
Although traditionally most creditors in a reorganization were not
investors, contemporary distressed-debt traders do in fact resemble

securities investors. They frequently "buy in" to the bankruptcy process and trade claims voluntarily and actively.3" Does it make functional
sense to apply the securities laws to them? In answering this question,
one might synthesize the disparate case law on claims trading as fol-

lows. First, as Robert Drain and Elizabeth Schwartz contend, there are
two scenarios in which the argument for treating claims as securities is
strongest: "(i) where active trading is taking place, particularly [insider
trading] and (ii) where an investor is seeking to acquire claims or a
class of claims to gain control of the reorganized debtor." 6 Part IV

illustrates that these are precisely the scenarios with which the claims
when issued but is a security when resold. Consider the humble home mortgage."). For a contemporary discussion of the question, see Mason and Pessin, Legal Issues in Claims Trading at 9
(cited in note 9) (arguing that increased liquidity and fewer covenantal protections in bank term
loans, combined with the involvement of largely unregulated hedge funds in trading them,
weaken the case against applying the securities laws to at least that kind of claim).
32
The only two cases to ask whether bankruptcy claims are securities contradicted each
other on similar, rather narrow, facts. Compare SEC v Texas InternationalCo,498 F Supp 1231,
1240 (ND I111980) (holding that fraud claims against a debtor counted as securities where the
settlement provided for transferal of claims into equity in the reorganized debtor), with Lipper v
Texas InternationalCo, 1979 WL 1200, *4 (WD Okla) (holding that the bankruptcy claims sold
by members of a tort class action settlement fund were not securities where the settlement provided for transferal of claims into equity in the reorganized debtor).
33
See, for example, Banco Espanolde Credito v Security Pacific NationalBank, 973 F2d 51,
56 (2d Cir 1992) (holding, over a strong and well reasoned dissent, that loan participations are
analogous to commercial bank loans and thus do not count as securities under the Reves test).
Loan participations, like claims, are instruments that normally are not securities, but "the manner
in which [they] ...are used, pooled, or marketed might establish that such participations are
securities." Id. Banco Espanol both illustrates the difficulty of applying the Reves test mechanically and provides some ideas relevant to claims trading regulation.
34 See, for example, United Housing Foundation, 421 US at 849 ("The primary purpose of
the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities
market. The focus of the Acts is on ...the need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the
interest of investors.").
35 See Drain and Schwartz, 10 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 620 (cited in note 7) (noting that
vulture investors actively seek to become creditors with the intent of turning a profit or gaining
control). These observations, and those of this paragraph generally, owe a great deal to Drain and
Schwartz's article at 620-21.
36
Id at 620-21. Note that by including the integrity of the reorganization process among
the concerns of securities law, Drain and Schwartz migbt follow the courts in mixing fiduciary
liability witb insider trading liability.
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trading remedies are in fact concerned, meaning that the remedies do
constitute an analogous regulatory regime.
Second, among several practical considerations that have persuaded many commentators to accept the assumption that claims are
not securities," the most important is precisely that these specialized
bankruptcy remedies do provide an alternative regulatory regime.8
Indeed, the existence of alternative bankruptcy remedies goes to the
fourth factor of the Reves test for withholding application of the securities laws.39
One must therefore ask: how well do bankruptcy courts do what
the securities laws would do if they applied to claims trading? Before
this Comment focuses on the alternative bankruptcy remedies, however, Part III provides some additional background on the two types
of liability involved and the kinds of harms they aim to prevent and
deter. As will be seen, these are the same harms animating the scenarios that most merit regulation under the securities laws and the claims
trading remedies.

37 See, for example, Resnick and Sommer, 9 Collier on Bankruptcy
94.08[11 at 94-132
(cited in note 6) ("It is therefore, difficult to see how, under existing case law, claims in bankruptcy can fall within the definition of 'security,' unless they qualified as securities prior to bankruptcy."). This observation may have further implications. Nothing about the filing of a bankruptcy petition changes the nature of the claim, which predates bankruptcy. The only thing a
petition does is allow a bankruptcy court to intervene according to the claims trading remedies.
This means that where the debtor has not yet filed a petition and no court can apply the bankruptcy remedies, the case for nonapplication of the securities laws to claims trading may be
correspondingly weaker.
38
Drain and Schwartz, 10 Am Bankr L Rev at 575 (cited in note 7).
39 Even before Reves, the Supreme Court at least twice based a holding that certain instrument are not securities on the presence of an alternative regulatory regime. See Marine
Bank, 455 US at 559 (holding that a bank certificate of deposit is not a security due to the adequate protection provided by the alternative regime of the banking laws); InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v Daniel, 439 US 551, 569-70 (1979) (holding that an interest in a noncontributory compulsory pension plan is not a security due to the alternative ERISA regime). Furthermore, the majority in Banco Espanol emphasized the narrow, commercial scope of the purchases at issue and the presence of an alternative regulatory regime under the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency. 973 F2d at 55.
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THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES AND THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING ' °

An inside trade can cause harm to two distinct parties." First, it
can harm the party with whom the insider trades. This generates the
core insider trading liability with which federal securities law, primar-

ily Rule 10b-5, is concerned. Second, an inside trade can harm third
parties to whom the insider owes some duty by statute, contract, or
fiduciary relationship. (This Comment focuses on obligations arising
from fiduciary duty.) This second, fiduciary theory of liability is not
unique to insider trading. It merely arises here as an instance of the
wider set of obligations, generally enforceable at state common law,
that a fiduciary owes to his principal. The legal concept of a fiduciary

simply indicates someone who manages someone else's property." The
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty track the concept-the fiduciary

cannot neglect or incompetently mismanage the principal's property,
and he cannot use it in his own interest rather than the interest of the
principal for whom he manages it. 3 Just like any fiduciary, therefore,

an insider (assuming he is also a fiduciary) who trades has duties of
care and loyalty." Thus, regardless of whether there was insider trad-

40 The distinction between fiduciary duties and insider trading proper is not new, although
it seldom receives attention. One exception is Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The
Economic Structure of CorporateLaw 269 (Harvard 1991) (pointing out problems with conflating fiduciary duties and insider trading). The original emphasis here is on the distinction in the
context of claims trading and the extent to which it separates the two legal regimes.
41 For general information on fiduciary duties and insider trading, see Larry D. Soderquist
and Theresa A. Gabaldon, Securities Law 143 (Foundation 2d ed 2004) (noting that insider trading regulations are most commonly applied to insiders with a fiduciary duty to their traders,
which may be the shareholders, to whom they have a fiduciary duty as beneficial owners of the
corporation); Easterbrook and Fischel at 265 (cited in note 40) (explaining the cause of action
for insider trading).
42
See Arthur R. Pinto and Douglas M. Branson, Understanding CorporateLaw 199 (Matthew Bender 2004) ("[A fiduciary relationship] is generally created when one is given power that
carries a duty to use that power to benefit another."). The word fiduciary comes from the Latin
fides, meaning "faith," or fiducia, meaning "trust," "confidence," or "assurance." See The American HeritageDictionaryof the English Language656 (Houghton Mifflin 4th ed 2000).
43 See Pinto and Branson, Understanding CorporateLaw at 200 (cited in note 42) (claiming that the duty of care requires the diligence of a reasonable person in similar circumstances
and that the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the corporation
and in good faith). Although one typically speaks of a duty of loyalty, it is worth noting that this
really denotes a duty of disinterestedness-a less vague and indeterminate term than loyalty, and
tied closer to the meaning of fiduciary. This Comment follows standard usage of the duty of
"loyalty," but on the assumption that the core of the duty is to be disinterested with respect to
the principal's property. Thanks to Richard Levin for this insight.
44 See, for example, In re TASER InternationalShareholderDerivative Litigaiion,2006 WL
687033, *14 (D Ariz) (describing allegations of breach of duty of care and loyalty where fiduciaries released mislcading information so they could sell stock at inflated prices).
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ing, whenever the fiduciary violates his obligations, the injured principal can usually sue in state court. 5
Insider trading law proper, by contrast, imposes liability particular to the inside trade. Most of the attention focuses on the federal
statutes, but state common law actions for insider trading remain
available."6 Indeed, the Exchange Act § 10(b)" and Rule 10b-5 codi4

fied and clarified the developing common law on insider trading. 9 At
the same time, the securities laws do not "provide a broad federal
remedy for all fraud."' Instead, Rule 10b-5 trains on a particular kind
of fraud, leaving general actions for the same state courts that adjudicate fiduciary duty cases. Doctrinally, civil liability for insider trading
requires that someone in possession of material, nonpublic informa45
See, for example, McMullin v Beran, 765 A2d 910,921 (Del 2000) (discussing the duty of
care); Guth v Loft, 5 A2d 503,510 (Del 1961) (discussing the duty of loyalty). See also Diamond
v Oreamuno, 248 NE2d 910, 915 (NY 1969) ("[N]othing in the Federal law [ ] indicates that it
was intended to limit the power of the States to fashion additional remedies to effectuate similar
purposes... The primary source of the law in this area ever remains that of the State which
created the corporation.").
46
For the debate about what state common law might be like now absent 10b-5, compare
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of CorporateLaw at 264-66 (cited in note 40)
(arguing that the common law does not preclude insider trading unless trade was induced by
misrepresentations by the insider or the insider violated the corporate opportunity doctrine),
with Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule-Insider Trading under State
Law, 45 Ala L Rev 753, 754 (1994) (arguing that there are at least five state law foundations for
civil insider trading liability).
47
Section 10(b) delegates to the SEC the regulation of manipulation or deception in the
purchase or sale of securities. 15 USC § 78j(b) (2000). Note that the language of the statute
controls the reach of Rule 10b-5. See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185,214 (1976) (recognizing that the scope of Rule 10b-5 "cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under 10h").
48 The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 15 USC
§ 78j (2000). Rule 10b-5 says:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 CFR § 240.10b-5.
49 For an outline of the state common law on insider trading in the 1930s, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Securities Law: Insider Trading 7-23 (Foundation 1999). Despite its common law
antecedents, federal law on insider trading is now firmly a creature of statute, and plaintiffs and
prosecutors must base their complaints on the statutory text. See Santa Fe Industries v Green, 430
US 462,472 (1977).
Reves, 494 US at 61 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
50
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tion cause another, to whom he owes a duty, to rely to his detriment
on representations the first person knew to be inaccurate.' The two
essential elements for the availability of big boy letters as defenses are
reliance and the duty requirement. Reliance is relatively straightforward: the noninsider must have relied to his detriment on the insider's
representations. The duty to disclose and the failure to disclose a ma-

terial fact establish a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 2 The function of the big boy letter is to rebut this presumption.
The duty requirement bears some of the responsibility for the
confusion between insider trading liability and fiduciary liability." Securities law and the law of claims trading are all in accord that the
possession of inside information alone does not suffice for legal liabil-

ity. One who has inside information must also be under a duty not to
trade without disclosing it in order to be liable for trading without
disclosure." Although the duty in question can be a fiduciary duty, it

51 Thus the black letter elements of insider trading are: materiality, causation of reliance,
reliance to the noninsider's detriment (harm), and a duty to disclose. See Bainbridge, Securities
Law: Insider Trading at 58-63 (cited in note 49). For more on the element of reliance, see Ann
Morales Olazdbal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-MarketCases Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3
Berkeley Bus L J 337,343 (2006).
52
Soderquist and Gabaldon, Securities Law at 148 (cited in note 41) (discussing the reliance requirement in nondisclosure situations), citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v United States, 406
US 128 (1972) (holding tbat a failure to disclose material facts is enough to establish reliance)
and Shapiro v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 495 F2d 228 (2d Cir 1974) (extending
Affiliated Ute to situations involving anonymous market transactions).
53 See Part V.B. For one case holding that big boy letters rebut this presumption, see Rissman v Rissman, 213 F3d 381, 384 (7th Cir 2000) ("A written anti-reliance clause precludes any
claim of deceit by prior representations."). See also Mark E. Betzen and Richard Meamber, Rule
lOb-5 and Related Considerations in Acquisition Agreements, Jones Day Commentaries (June
2004), online at http://wwwl.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs-detail.aspx?publD=S1265 (visited Jan 12,
2008) (addressing potential effects of common "big boy" boilerplate language).
54
The Supreme Court recently furthered the conflation of insider trading liability proper
and fiduciary liability. In United States v O'Hagan, 521 US 642 (1997), the justices expanded 10b-5
liability to include a "misappropriation" theory, according to which an insider can be liable to the
source of his information if he has a fiduciary duty to that source, even if he has no duty to the
party with whom he trades. Id at 652, codified in 17 CFR § 240.10b5-2. The opinion does not
explain why Rule 10b-5 should remedy this misappropriation, which would seem to be a straightforward violation of the law of fiduciary duties adjudicable in state court. The problem is that
misappropriation, just like, for example, self-dealing by committee members, is merely a species
of the wider class of violations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and fair dealing. But the law of
fiduciary duties is not the law of insider trading, and misappropriation theory confuses the two.
There is therefore a latent federalism issue in this aggrandizement of federal insider trading law,
for in expanding its reach it encroaches upon a traditional province of state courts. See Bainbridge, Securities Law: Insider Trading at 63-67 (cited in note 49). The Supreme Court has occasionally recognized the issue, see, for example, Santa Fe, 430 US at 473-74, but decisions such as
O'Haganconfirm its unwillingness to apply the distinction rigorously.
55 See, for example, Chiarellav United States, 445 US 222,227-28 (1980) (noting that liability depends on fraud and holding that one cannot commit fraud by withholding information
unless there is a duty to disclose).
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does not have to be, and Justice Frankfurter famously criticized facile
reliance on the presence of such a duty to find liability."
Recall the two scenarios that Drain and Schwartz pointed to as
cases for regulation: where active trading, particularly insider trading,
was occurring and where parties were acquiring claims to control the
reorganization or the debtor itself. One can distinguish these two situations according to the two legal regimes at issue: insider trading on the
one hand and fiduciary duties on the other." The same harms-taking
advantage of a trading partner in a worse position and self-dealingunderlie the situations meriting regulation as underlie the legal regimes.
Against this background understanding, the next two Parts analyze in
detail the bankruptcy remedies for insider claims trading and two solutions that investors have generated to solve the problems associated
with that trading: the Chinese Wall and the big boy letter.
IV THE BANKRUPTCY REMEDIES
Although nothing in the Code explicitly addresses claims trading,

courts have extrapolated from various provisions to provide remedies
to parties that object to certain claims trades, consistent with the equitable powers of a bankruptcy court.m Though some midcentury jurisprudence made much of bankruptcy courts' powers of equity, 9 the contemporary view requires bankruptcy courts to exercise their equitable pow-

56
See SEC v Chenery Corp, 318 US 80, 85-86 (1943) ("[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary
only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry."). See also Easterbrook and Fischel, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 269-70 (cited in note 40) (arguing that both actual
contracts and the probable outcome absent transaction costs suggest legal rules opposite those
devised by emphasizing fiduciary duties).
57
Part IV illustrates the relationship between fiduciary duties and trading claims to control the reorganization.
58
FRBP 3001(e) used to allow courts the power to review most trades sua sponte on substantive grounds, but Congress amended the Rule in 1991 in the wake of some bankruptcy court
decisions that aggressively regulated claims trading. For an example of the pre-amendment use
of this rule, see In re Revere Copper & Brass,Inc, 58 BR 1, 2 (Bankr SDNY 1985) ("Bankruptcy
Rule 3001(e)(2) contemplates that the court will enter the order of substitution only after a
hearing on notice and further permits the court to enter such an order as is appropriate."). Now
the court merely fulfills a ministerial rolc and can only step in when a transferor objects to a
claim transfer. See In re Olson, 120 F3d 98, 102 (8th Cir 1997) (holding that the language of the
Rule as amended is mandatory and gives the court no role absent an objection). No court has held,
however, that the amended Rule precludes the claims trading remedies themselves. This is because
"the purpose of the amendment is to lessen the court's involvement when claims are transferred,"
In re Odd Lot Trading, Inc, 115 BR 97,101 (Bankr ND Ohio 1990), not the court's ability to fashion
remedies for parties who sue claims traders.
59 The classic, commonly cited case for a bankruptcy court's inherent powers of equity is
American United Mutual Life Insurance Co v City of Avon Park, 311 US 138, 146 (1940) ("That
power [to adjust the remedy] is ample for the exigencies of varying situations. It is not dependent
on express statutory provision. It inheres in the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy.").
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ers in ways consistent with the statute.60 They have done just that, deriving from the Code remedies for abusive trading by fiduciary creditors.
The cases applying the remedies illustrate that three core concerns animate the claims trading case law: (1) purchasers taking advantage of unsophisticated sellers;' (2) purchasers acquiring claims in
order to manipulate the reorganization plan process;6 and (3) the use
of inside information that the debtor provided in confidence for a
corporate purpose.6' Though these concerns could apply to a great
60 See In re Kmart Corp, 359 F3d 866, 871 (7th Cir 2004) (rejecting the argument that 11
USC § 105 provides free-floating authority for orders not otherwise allowed in the Code). See
also Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 6-7 (cited in note 14) (arguing that § 105 of the Code
reflects the equitable origins of bankruptcy, but that a judge's particular exercises of his power
under § 105 must rest on other provisions of the Code). Debate continues about the extent of the
bankruptcy courts' equitable powers. See generally Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common
Law of Bankruptcy:JudicialLawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 Am Bankr L J 1 (2006) (arguing that courts lost most of their equitable power when certain sections of the Code were repealed); Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge:A Statutory
Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 Am Bankr L J 1 (2005) (arguing that a bankruptcy judge has very little inherent power and no equitable power); Marcia S. Krieger, "The
Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity": What Does That Mean?, 50 SC L Rev 275 (1999) (considering why a bankruptcy court is characterized as a court of equity and to what degree it can
serve as one); Brian Leepson, Note & Comment, A Case for the Use of Broad Court Equity
Power to FacilitateChapter 11 Reorganization,12 Bankr Dev J 775 (1996) (reviewing arguments
for and against bankruptcy courts' equitable power and arguing for a broad equity power). The
view that bankruptcy courts retain equitable powers is the dominant one and consistent with the
plain language of § 105 of the Code. See 11 USC § 105(a) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
61 See, for example, In re Revere Copper, 58 BR at 2 ("One of the evils attendant upon a
solicitation of assignment of claims for a cash payment ... is that solicited creditors may be unaware of their rights and options.").
62
See, for example, In re Applegate Property, 133 BR 827,835 (Bankr WD Tex 1991) ("The
purchasing of claims by an affiliate or insider of the Debtor for the sole or principle [sic] purpose of
blocking a competitor from purchasing such claims ... cannot, as a matter of law, be in good faith.").
63
See, for example, In re Allegheny International, nc, 118 BR 282, 299 (Bankr WD Pa
1990) ("Japonica sought and received inside information as a proponent of a plan. This court finds
as a matter of fact that Japonica is an insider and a fiduciary for purpose of this reorganization.").
This view of core concerns both reflects Drain and Schwartz's two scenarios most meriting
application of the securities laws and accords with the Supreme Court's concern in Wolf v
Weinstein, 372 US 633 (1963), that fiduciaries who trade in the securities of the debtor risk two
"particular dangers," id at 642. Even though that case involved noncreditor insiders of the
debtor, the Court's observations remain applicable:

On the one hand, an insider is in a position to conceal from other stockholders vital information concerning the Debtor's financial condition or prospects, which may affect the value
of its securities, until after he has reaped a private profit from the use of that information.
On the other hand, one who exercises control over a reorganization holds a post which
might tempt him to affect or influence corporate policies-even the shaping of the very
plan of reorganization-for the benefit of his own security holdings but to the detriment of
the Debtor's interests and those of its creditors and other interested groups.
Id. Importantly, the first danger is ambiguous. Commentators have described it as a "misuse of
inside information by the fiduciary," Robert C. Pozen and Judy K. Mencher, Chinese Walls for
Creditors' Committees, 48 Bus L 747, 753 (1993), but it is unclear what constitutes the misuse and
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extent to insiders selling claims as well as purchasing them, most of
the cases in the courts have involved insider purchasers. Crucially,
note that the first concern involves the insider trading theory of liability, while the other two closely match the fiduciary theory of liability.
Big boy letters and Chinese Walls also map onto this distinction. 5
A. Equitable Subordination
Section 510(c) of the Code allows a court, "under principles of
equitable subordination, [to] subordinate for purposes of distribution
... an allowed claim to ... another allowed claim or ... an allowed
interest to ... another allowed interest." Equitable subordination is

the most common and important of the remedies bankruptcy courts
use to regulate claims trading." The basic elements required for a
court to order equitable subordination are: (1) that the claimant "engaged in some type of inequitable conduct"; (2) that the misconduct
"resulted in injury to the creditors or conferred an unfair advantage
on the claimant"; and (3) that equitable subordination "not be inconsistent with the provisions of the bankruptcy code." 67
The equitable subordination cases dealing with claims trading by
fiduciaries all state the basic remedy: that the court may limit recovery
on the claims to the amount the trader paid for them.6' But the decisions issued during the Papercraft bankruptcy go into the most detail
why. Is it the duty of the corporate insider to the corporation's shareholders not to profit at their
expense? Or is it the duty not to profit personally from inside information? The former seems
preferable, given that American law has moved away from the blanket "disclose or abstain" rule of
SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, 401 F2d 833, 849 (2d Cir 1968), which suggested that parties to a
trade had to have equal information. This is not the law today. See Moskowitz v Lopp, 128 FRD
624, 633 (ED Pa 1989) ("Read together, Chiarella and Dirks stand for the proposition that insider
liability under Rule lOb-5 is limited to investors to whom the corporate insider owes a fiduciary
duty."), citing Chiarellav United States, 445 US 222 (1980), and Dirks v SEC,463 US 646 (1983).
64 See generally, for example, In re Pleasant Hill Partner, LP, 163 BR 388 (Bankr ND Ga
1994); In re Applegate Property, 133 BR 827; In re Cumberland Farmr Inc, 181 BR 678 (Bankr D
Mass 1995), reversed on other grounds, Haseotes v Cumberland Farm, Inc, 216 BR 690 (D Mass 1997).
65
See Part V.
66 See, for example, In re Enron Corp, 333 BR 205,237 (Bankr SDNY 2005) (holding that
equitable subordination applies to any claims held by a claimant where inequitable conduct took
place). See also Steven 0. Weise, Teresa Wilton Harmon, and Lynn A. Soukup, 2006 Commercial
Law Developments, in Commercial Lending and Banking Law 1,62-63 (ALI-ABA 2007) (claiming that equitable subordination is one of the two most common tools of bankruptcy courts).
67
Citicorp Venture Capital,Ltd v Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160
F3d 982, 986 (3d Cir 1998) (granting equitable subordination where the fiduciary purchased
notes at a discount based on inside information to make a profit and influence the reorganization plan for its own gain without disclosing this information to any third parties).
68 See, for example, In re Cumberland Farms, 181 BR at 681; In re Gladstone Glen, 739 F2d
1233, 1236-37 (7th Cir 1984). See also In re Norcor Manufacturing Co, 109 F2d 407,411 (7th Cir
1940) (holding that a fiduciary could not purchase a claim at a discount and then claim an
amount in excess of the value actually paid).
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about claims trading by a creditor with inside information who was a

fiduciary because he was on the debtor's board of directors. The Papercraft cases also illustrate well the three core concerns of equitable

subordination listed above: taking advantage of unsophisticated parties, controlling the reorganization, and misusing information acquired
from the debtor.
The cases arose when Citicorp Venture Capital (CVC), a prepeti-

tion creditor of the debtor, Papercraft, purchased 40 percent of Papercraft's unsecured debt in order to block the debtor's reorganization
plan and advance CVC's own plan. Because CVC had named directors to the boards of Papercraft and some of its affiliated entities, it
was a fiduciary of the debtor.'
Though at the time of the petition CVC held none of Papercraft's
unsecured notes, CVC's representative on Papercraft's board used a
seven-month delay between the filing of the Chapter 11 petition and
the filing of the debtor's disclosure statement (required to confirm the
debtor's plan for voting) to purchase the 40 percent stake in Papercraft's debt.' CVC's representative on the board did so without informing the creditors' committee, the bankruptcy court, or the Papercraft board of directors, and made all of the purchases through an
anonymous broker.7'3 The selling noteholders, therefore, had no idea
who their buyer was. In the meantime, CVC's director orchestrated a
process whereby CVC acquired material information about Papercraft that remained unavailable to the other creditors, and CVC prepared its own reorganization plan on the basis of that information.7 ,
69
The cases, in chronological order, are: In re Papercraft Corp, 187 BR 486, 501-02 (Bankr
WD Pa 1995) (declining to subordinate claims because no harm was proven even though the
creditor controlled a board seat on the debtor's board and purchased claims without the connection); In re Papercraft Corp, 211 BR 813, 824, 827 (Bankr WD Pa 1997) (holding that the creditor's conduct was inequitable and should therefore be subordinated); Citicorp, 160 F3d at 982
(affirming the district court decision); In re Papercraft Corp, 247 BR 625,632-33 (Bankr WD Pa
2000) (subordinating claims to an amount below the purchase price to compensate the other
parties for the fiduciary breach); Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd v Committee of Creditors Holding
Unsecured Claims, 323 F3d 228, 236 (3d Cir 2003) (affirming the bankruptcy court decision).
70
This account of the facts comes from the circuit court's summation. See Citicorp, 160 F3d
at 984-86. The claims against the debtor are divided into separate classes for the purpose of
voting on the plan. Any creditor with 33 percent or more of the claims in each class of claims
against the debtor has a "blocking position" in the reorganization plan. See 11 USC § 1126(c)
("A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors.., that hold
at least two-thirds in amount ... of the allowed claims.").
71 See In re Papercraft, 187 BR at 495 n 7.
72
Citicorp, 160 F3d at 985. It should be noted that CVC did not play a role in creating the
delay-it merely exploited the situation. Id at 992. For the requirement that the debtor file a
disclosure statement, see 11 USC § 1126(b).
73 Citicorp, 160 F3d at 985.
74

Id.
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When CVC announced its plan and disclosed that it had been purchasing claims all along, the creditors' committee sued."
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court limited CVC's recovery on the
claims to the amount it paid for them and ordered it to compensate
the nonselling creditors for harms its behavior had caused them. 6 The
Papercraft saga illustrates the kind of behavior the courts use equitable subordination to combat and the harms they use it to remedy.'
The circuit court described the findings of the bankruptcy court
as the "paradigm case of inequitable conduct by a fiduciary."78 These
included the facts that CVC purchased the claims for the "dual purpose of making a profit ... and ... influenc[ing] the reorganization in

its own self-interest"; that CVC had "the benefit of non-public information acquired as a fiduciary"; and that CVC had not disclosed its
purchasing plans or, in the case of the selling note holders, its identity
"to the bankruptcy court, the Papercraft board, the Committee, or the
selling note holders."" To summarize the findings: CVC engaged in
inside claims trading without disclosing its purchasing plans in order
to make money and control the reorganization process.
It is unclear which part of the "dual purpose" the court found
more offensive-the profit-making or the control of the reorganization" -but it may not be important to resolve this ambiguity. A party's
intentions, of course, frequently make a poor peg on which to hang liability. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that an entity would gain control of a reorganization in order not to make money-making money is,
after all, what companies do. Numerous decisions confirm that a creditor's attempt to make money does not alone constitute objectionable
behavior. 8 The relevant question seems to be whether the creditor profits by controlling the reorganization at the expense of its constituentsa consummate violation of the fiduciary's duty to act disinterestedly.
The circuit court's discussion of CVC's motive supports this interpretation. Rebuffing CVC's contentions of a legitimate motive, the
circuit court observed that "the [bankruptcy] court found that CVC
75

Id at 986.

See In re Papercraft,247 BR at 632-33.
It is worth noting that doctrinally, "[t]he Papercraft cases stand for the proposition that
equitable subordination may go beyond disgorgement of profits." Mabey, Legal Consequences at
52 (cited in note 16).
78
Citicorp, 160 F3d at 987-88.
76

77

79

Id at 987.

This ambiguity is also present in the Supreme Court's opinion in Wolf, 372 US at 642.
See, for example, In re Figter Ltd, 118 F3d 635, 639 (9th Cir 1997) ("If a selfish motive
were sufficient to condemn [ ] policies of interested parties, very few, if any, would pass muster.");
In re Mikulec Industries,Inc, 1992 WL 170685, *2 (WDNY) ("It is well-settled that a vote cast in
a creditor's self-interest is not necessarily a vote cast in bad faith. In this sense, creditors are
expected to vote selfishly-that is, consistently with their economic best interests.").
80

81
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intended to profit not only from the purchase of the notes at a discount but also from gaining control of the reorganization."" This
statement suggests that CVC's self-interested control of the reorganization was integral to the court's finding that CVC's behavior satisfied
the inequitable motive element required for equitable subordination.
The circuit court listed three cognizable injuries that the Committee and Papercraft suffered. First, the "selling note holders were deprived of the ability to make a fully informed decision." 3 Second,
"CVC diluted the voting rights of members of the Committee ...
[and] secured a position of influence over the reorganization negotiations."" Third, "CVC's actions created a conflict of interest which
jeopardized its ability to make decisions in the best interest of the
[debtor]. 85 These three harms nicely illustrate the three core concerns
discussed above-the first harm concerns unsophisticated or perhaps
merely ignorant or deceived sellers, the second concerns abuse of the
reorganization plan process, and the third concerns a use of inside
information in conflict with a fiduciary duty to the debtor company. In
addition, that these should be the harms bolsters the position that selfinterestedly controlling the reorganization, as opposed to making
money, formed the critical part of CVC's inequitable motive. The importance of the integrity of the reorganization process appears at the
end of the opinion too, when the court describes "CVC's attempt to
control the reorganization" as the harm to the nonselling creditors.B.

Voting Remedies

Normally, the claims that creditors have against the debtor represent
votes that the creditor casts to accept or reject a reorganization plan.
When the bankruptcy court finds that a creditor fiduciary has behaved
objectionably, it has recourse to remedies that diminish the voting
power of a claims purchaser. These voting remedies further illustrate
the centrality of the reorganization process to claims trading regulation.
82 Citicorp, 160 F3d at 989 (emphasis added) (reasoning that the latter intention showed
that CVC did not have the best interests of the debtor in mind when it secretly purchased claims
at a discount).
83
Id (quotation marks and citations omitted).
84 Id (noting that this was an unfair advantage even though "CVC ultimately did not vote
its claims").
85
Id at 989-90 (concluding that these three harms were together "sufficient to justify
subordination").
86 Id at 991-92 (remanding to the bankruptcy court for a determination of "whether the
record supports the proposition that the non-selling creditors suffered loss as a result of a delay
in confirmation caused by CVC advocacy of its competing plan and objections to the [alternative] plan").
87 See 11 USC § 1126.
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The most common voting remedy is vote designation under
§ 1126(e)." This allows a court to "designate the vote of a fiduciary or
insider who votes or procures votes in bad faith." The Code does not
define "bad faith," but case law has given content to the term. Several
cases make clear that "enlightened self-interest" does not equal bad

faith and that § 1126(e) "does not require creditors to act selflessly."'
The definitive case in this area is In re Figter Ltd," which held that

courts may find bad faith if the trader purchased claims "to secure
some untoward advantage over other creditors for some ulterior motive."9' The In re Figter court offered as examples of bad faith ulterior
motives the following rather dramatic examples: "[P]ure malice, ...
blackmail, and the purpose to destroy an enterprise in order to advance the interests of a competing business.""
Although the In re Figtercase remains the legal rule, other cases

furnish instructive data points, and they all suggest that acquiring a
blocking position, capitalizing on inside information, and seeking to
control the reorganization process in a creditor's self-interest make
the strongest case for vote designation. The most extreme case is In re
4 the rhetoric and reasoning of which is
Allegheny International,Inc,"

somewhat outmoded, but which still furnishes an instructive example.
In In re Allegheny, a distressed-debt investor called Japonica acquired

inside information from its fiduciary relationship to the debtor (and
therefore to the debtor's creditors)." Immediately before filing its own
plan proposal, Japonica bought more than enough claims to secure a
blocking position.9 The court was "hard pressed to characterize Ja-

ponica's actions as merely furthering [its] own economic interests."''
88
"[T]he court may designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was
not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title."
89 Mabey, Legal Consequences at 55 (cited in note 16).
90 Id at 56 n 60 (collecting cases).
91 118 F3d 635 (9th Cir 1997) (holding that a creditor did not act in bad faith where it used
acquired claims to protect its interests as the major creditor of the debtor and prevented a plan
that may have resulted in an undesirable mix of debtors and nondebtors in a property on which
the creditor held a lien).
92 Id at 639 (cautioning that this does not mean creditors must act with a high degree of
altruism).
93
Id (quotation marks omitted). See also Novikoff and Gerschwer, Selected Topics in
Claims Trading at 201-04 (cited in note 4).
94 118BR282 (Bankr WD Pa 1990).
95 See id at 298-99. See also In re Papercraft,187 BR at 498 ("Upon insolvency of the
corporation, the director's fiduciary duty extends to the corporation's creditors and is enforceable by the trustee.").
96 In re Allegheny, 118 BR at 286-87.
97 Id at 290 (noting that Japonica acquired blocking positions in two classes that had directly opposed interests to one another).
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Because Japonica's actions constituted a "naked attempt to purchase
votes '"

in order to stage a hostile takeover of the debtor, the judge

designated the votes." Combined with cases that suggest that creditors
"are entitled to act out of pure self-interest when voting their claims,"
In re Allegheny suggests that the bolder the attempt to co-opt the reorganization process, the likelier it is that there is bad faith. ' A later
court bolstered this impression, remarking that the "closer a proposed

transaction gets to the heart of the reorganization process, the greater
scrutiny the Court must give to the matter."'0 '
A court can also view a claims purchase as an impermissible solicitation without disclosure of an acceptance or rejection of a plan,
which is prohibited by § 1125(b) of the Code.'O' Under § 1125(b), the

court can impose civil contempt, monetary, and other penalties on the
claims purchaser.' 3 In In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc,'°4 the court

found that claims purchasers with inside information that they did not
disclose had solicited claims purchases from unsophisticated sellers in
order to buy claims at a discount.'5° The opinion analogized such solici-

tation of claims purchases to soliciting an acceptance or rejection of a
plan.'" This remedy has fallen out of favor since the 1980s and origi-

Id at 297.
Idat290.
100 Novikoff and Gerschwer, Selected Topics in Claims Trading at 204 (cited in note 4) (noting that the bad faith determination seemed to be based on the mechanics of the acquisition of
claims, which evinced an ulterior motive). Other voting remedies support this conclusion. See, for
example, In re Applegate Property,133 BR at 835 (emphasizing in the context of a vote exclusion
remedy under 11 USC § 1129(a)(10) that a creditor cannot buy claims for the purpose of preventing a competitor from buying the claims).
101 In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, 254 BR 5, 12-13 (Bankr D NH 2000) (denying a disclosure
statement for an intercreditor commitment where the commitment appeared to be a de facto
reorganization plan).
102 The provision requires anyone who solicits an acceptance or rejection of a plan from a
holder of a claim or interest before the transmittal of a court-approved disclosure to provide that
holder with a summary of the plan and a written disclosure statement, approved by the court,
containing "adequate information." Section 1125(a) of the Code defines "adequate information"
basically as whatever information about the debtor's financial position "would enable ... a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan."
103 See Mabey, Legal Consequences at 55 (cited in note 16).
104 58 BR 1 (Bankr SDNY 1985).
105 Phoenix solicited creditors to transfer their claims to Phoenix for 20 percent of face
value. Id at 1. The court was "concerned that the assignor-creditors ha[d] not been plainly advised of their options" and could not make a good decision about whether to sell their claim. Id
at 2. It appeared that Phoenix was trying to buy claims from unsophisticated parties for 20 percent of face value so it could recover around 65 percent of face value when the reorganization
plan was approved. Id at 2.
106 See id at 2-3 (requiring the claims purchaser to provide disclosure of the debtor's proposed reorganization plan to any future sellers and imposing a thirty-day grace period for previous sellers to revoke their sales).
98
99
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nally signaled a concern with purchasers taking advantage of sellers,"7
but it might be applied to vote-buying similar to that at issue in In re
Allegheny. Indeed, the In re Allegheny court implicitly recognized the
possibility that Japonica had also violated § 1125.'"

C. Rule 2019 Disclosures
Finally, a recent opinion in the Southern District of New York's
Bankruptcy Court indicates a willingness to use Rule 2019 to regulate
fiduciaries. ' O'Rule 2019(a) requires "every entity or committee representing more than one creditor or equity security holder," except for
official committees, to file a statement containing, among other information, "the amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the
members of the committee ... , the times when acquired, the amounts

paid therefor [sic], and any sales or other disposition thereof."" Crucially, the Rule also requires supplemental statements updating the
positions of committee members. Rule 2019(b) permits the court to
enforce this disclosure by barring parties from intervening in the case,
by reversing an undisclosed transfer, or by imposing voting remedies."' In the ongoing Northwest Airlines bankruptcy, Judge Gropper
forced a committee of equity holders to correct a deficient Rule 2019

statement."2 He characterized the rule as designed to limit self-dealing
and overreaching by unregulated committees and refused to follow

previous cases watering down the rule.13

107 See Drain and Schwartz, 10 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 578, 589 (cited in note 7) (arguing
that bankruptcy courts have narrowly construed solicitation under § 1125(b) since a 1991
amendment to Rule 3001(e) aimed at limiting oversight of claims trading), citing Century Glove,
Inc v FirstAmerican Bank of New York, 860 F2d 94, 101 (3d Cir 1988) (rejecting any definition of
solicitation under § 1125(b) that would limit creditor negotiations and asserting that § 1125 must
be read narrowly) and In re Clamp-All Corp, 233 BR 198, 205-06 (Bankr D Mass 1999) (asserting that Century Glove is now the majority view).
108 See 118 BR at 296-97.
109 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp, 363 BR 701,704 (Bankr SDNY 2007) (explaining that
the Rule arose because of apparent deception and overreaching by unofficial committees).
110 See also Resnick and Sommer, 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ch 2019 (cited in note 6).
111 See also id 2019.05[1]-[2] at 2019-8 to -9.
112 See In re Northwest Airlines, 363 BR at 704 (holding that Rule 2019 requires an unofficial
committee to provide information on individual committee members, not just the committee in the
aggregate). In a subsequent decision, Judge Gropper also denied the motion of the ad hoc committee to file its documents under seal. See id at 709 (holding that Rule 2019's purpose of allowing
those potentially represented by the committee to assess the representative nature of the committee overrode any interest the committee members had in keeping the information confidential).
113 See id at 704. Note that the members of unofficial committees may be fiduciaries of
those similarly situated. 1d; Mabey, Legal Consequences at 48-49 (cited in note 16). Almost no
case law exists on Rule 2019, and what does exist mostly involves mass tort litigation over asbestos cases The In re Northwest Airlines opinion broke new ground, and the repercussions of the
holding are not yet clear. Interpreting Rule 2019 as requiring disclosures of individual creditors'
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This decision, and others like it,"' may portend a trend toward us-

ing Rule 2019 statements to monitor fiduciaries by requiring continuous disclosure of the claims bought and sold by informal groups of
creditors."' This use of the Rule might limit the ability of hedge funds
and other claims investors to participate collectively in a Chapter 11

reorganization. But the issue remains unsettled in the wake of a recent
decision in the Scopac bankruptcy denying a Rule 2019
disclosure mo16
tion similar to the one Northwest Airlines had filed.

V BIG BOYS AND CHINESE WALLS
A.

One Solution for Creditors on Committees: Chinese Walls

The remedies described in this Comment can apply to creditors
on committees who trade in claims against the debtor."' Fear of liability under the bankruptcy remedies began to scare some major creditors in bankruptcies off committees, a situation that deprived the reorganization process of the benefit of those committees: a forum for
major debtholders of the troubled firm to negotiate and plan the fuclaim transfers gives the Rule a certain force it lacked in the past, but as of this printing the
holding has not gained wide purchase. See note 116 and accompanying text.
114 See, for example, In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp, 327 BR 554,560 (D Del 2005) (affirming
an order restricting access to Rule 2019 information to those who file a motion with the court);
Baron & Budd, PC v Unsecured Asbestos Claimants Committee, 321 BR 147, 166-67 (Bankr D
NJ 2005) (holding that an order requiring disclosure of any fee-sharing relationships between
committee members did not exceed the scope of Rule 2019, because they are pertinent facts in
connection with the employment of the entity); In re CF Holding Corp, 145 BR 124, 126 (Bankr
D Conn 1992) (holding that Rule 2019 was designed to cover those who act in a fiduciary capacity to those they represent and applies to attorneys who represent more than one claimant).
115 See Resnick and Sommer, 9 Collier on Bankruptcy 91[ 2019.01-.02 at 2019-3 to -4 (cited
in note 6). Claims traders on unofficial committees must meet the requirements of Rule 2019
over and above any Chinese Walls or big boy letters they use. It may be that Judge Gropper is
responding to the comparative freedom of unofficial committees-they owe narrower fiduciary
duties and are not subject to as much monitoring as official committees-by ensuring that Rule
2019 applies to rein in overreaching by their unregulated members, particularly hedge funds. See
Eric B. Fisher and Andrew L. Buck, Hedge Funds and the Changing Face of CorporateBankruptcy
Practice,25 Am Bankr Inst J 24, 87-88 (2007) (asking whether Rule 2019 can cover short selling
when the seller does not hold the stock and also whether such coverage is desirable given that many
unofficial committees include hedge fund managers). For an outline of the particular difficulties
hedge funds trading in distressed debt pose to the reorganization process, see generally id.
116 In re Scotia Development LLC, No 07-20027-C-11 (Bankr SD Tex, Apr 18, 2007) (unpublished order entered eight days following the denial of a motion at an April 10, 2007 hearing)
(denying the motion on the grounds that the creditors opposing the motion did not constitute a
committee within the meaning of Rule 2019). For the initial reaction to the In re Northwest Airlines decision among practitioners, see generally Paul D. Leake and Mark G. Douglas, Ad Hoc
Committee Disclosure Requirement-A Bitter Pill to Swallow for Distressed Investors, Bus Structuring Rev (Jones Day May/June 2007), online at http://www.jonesdaycomr/pubs/pubs-detail.aspx?
publD=S4311 (visited Jan 12,2008).
117 See Part III. Recall that as fiduciaries, they may not violate their duty of loyalty by trading against the interest of their principals.
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ture of the debtor. As a result, would-be committee members started
to request "that bankruptcy courts pre-approve Chinese Walls ...so as

to immunize them in advance from violating their fiduciary duties as
committee members if they trade in the debtor's claims and securi-

ties."" 8 The court in In re Federated Department Stores, Inc,"9 was the

first to issue such a trading order,O and other courts have followed
suit. " Note that courts do not require Chinese Walls; rather, courts
allow parties to use Chinese Walls as defenses to the claims trading
remedies. In essence, Chinese Walls are defenses that courts approve
in advance. The remedies constitute the substance of the regulatory
regime; the Chinese Wall simply suspends the regulation by preventing the harms that courts aim to remedy.
But Chinese Walls do not prevent all the harms associated with insider claims trading that cause courts concern. They can prevent harms
from violations of the duty of loyalty because the committee members
of the relevant creditor firm, insulated from the positions of the firm's
traders, cannot conduct their committee activities in the interest of the
firm's trading position. The committee members, after all, do not know
what that trading position is. But Chinese Walls do not affect the relationship between a trader who already has inside information and the
parties with whom he trades. Chinese Walls address fiduciary hability
well but fail to guard against core insider trading liability.
A Chinese Wall is simply a name for a body of policies and procedures that separate the trading activities of a financial institution
from its activities as a member of a committee. Chinese Walls typically
require that:
1. The committee member "cause all of its personnel engaged in
committee-related activities ('Committee Personnel') to execute
a letter acknowledging that they may receive non-public information and that they are aware of the order and the procedures
which are in effect";
Novikoff and Gerschwer, Selected Topics in Claims Trading at 199-200 (cited in note 4).
119 1991 WL 79143 (Bankr SD Ohio).
120 See id at *2 ("Ordered, that Fidelity will not be violating its fiduciary duties as a commit118

tee member and accordingly, will not be subjecting its claims to possible .. adverse treatment by
trading in securities of the Debtor ...provided that Fidelity employs an appropriate information
blocking device or 'Chinese Wall."').
121 See Novikoff and Gerschwer, Selected Topics in Claims Trading at 200 (cited in note 4)
(listing several examples of bankruptcy courts issuing Chinese Wall orders). See also, for example, In re House of Fabrics,1995 Bankr LEXIS 1380, *4 (Bankr CD Cal) ("Ordered, the institutional members of the Equity Committee who engage in the trading of securities will not be
violating their fiduciary duties as committee members by trading securities of the Debtor ...
provided that the Equity Committee member institutes appropriate and effective information
blocking procedures.").
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2.

Committee Personnel "not share non-public committee information with other employees" (with certain exceptions);

3.

Committee Personnel "keep non-public [committee] information
... in files inaccessible to other employees";

4.

Committee Personnel "receive no information regarding trades in
[claims] of the debtor in advance of such trades" (except for certain customary reports);

5.

review
"[T]he committee member's compliance department
from time to time the [Chinese] [W]all procedures ... to insure
compliance with the order and [] keep and maintain records of
their review." "2

Courts have proven willing to issue trading orders allowing
claims trading pursuant to these Chinese Walls, and there is evidence
that they often allow the creditor on a committee to trade without
incurring liability. '
Chinese Walls are designed to prevent a creditor firm from appropriating committee information in its own trading interest by keeping the committee members and traders in ignorance of each other.
Essentially, the Chinese Wall should effectively prevent claims trading
activity from driving a committee member's behavior and encouraging
the creditor to abuse and co-opt the reorganization process for its own
benefit at the expense of other creditors. In addition, insofar as creditors on the committee acquire confidential information of the debtor,
the Chinese Wall should keep that information off the trading desks.
In other words, Chinese Walls address the two core concerns of the
bankruptcy remedies that track the law of fiduciary duties: control of
the reorganization process and violation of duties of confidentiality to
the debtor.
But trading walls are not a panacea and there are certain harms
they cannot prevent. 2 Although a Chinese Wall works in both directions-information can flow neither from the trader to the committee
member nor from the committee member to the trader-the traders
in the creditor's firm may still acquire inside information from other
sources and may still trade on the basis of this information. The firm
may have a longstanding relationship with the debtor, for instance,

Novikoff and Gerschwer, Selected Topics in Claims Trading at 201 (cited in note 4).
See, for example, In re FederatedDepartment Stores, 1991 WL at *2-3 (ordering that the
creditor not suffer adverse effects for trading in debtor claims so long as it implements courtapproved Chinese Wall procedures). See also Mabey, Legal Consequences at 58 (cited in note 16).
124 See generally Carolyn E.C. Paris, How to Draft for Corporate Finance § 23:5:5 at 23-35
(PLI 2004) (noting that even with Chinese Walls there may still be conflicts and perceived conflicts).
122
123
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that affords it access to inside information. Or the firm may be a
hedge fund immersed in the industry and privy to rumors from other
parties involved about the reorganization process. A recent decision in
the Enron cases, denying a motion to dismiss the debtor's request for
equitable subordination of certain claims, held that "equitable subordination is not limited to only those claims related to the inequitable
conduct that caused the injury to the creditor class. Rather, equitable

subordination can apply to any claim unrelated to any inequitable conduct held by the claimant alleged to have engaged in that conduct..'.
The court made other important rulings, ' but this one is the most
far-reaching because it limits the potential effectiveness of Chinese
Walls. On the one hand, the decision implies "that the court may subordinate claims that were purchased by claims traders working on the
other side of an established Trading Wall.' 27 On the other hand, if a
claims trader buys claims of the debtor from creditors on the basis of
inside information, the Enron decision may make the claims the

committee member represents also subject to subordination. This
would mean that liability originating in the relationship between a
firm's claims traders and their trading partners can spread to parts of
the firm on the other side of the Chinese Wall.
Some other practical problems with Chinese Walls also make it
desirable to find alternatives. Even "if they 'work,' in that each group's
activities judged separately were defensible, they can make the firm as
a whole look foolish..'. This is because, "[b]y design, 'the right hand

In re Enron Corp, 2005 WL 3832053, *1 (Bankr SDNY 2005).
The other two conclusions were that: "[T]he transfer of a claim subject to equitable
subordination does not free such claim from subordination in the hands of the transferee," id,
and "a transferee purchasing a post-petition claim cannot avail itself of the 'good faith' defense
because such transferee is not a purchaser who took without knowledge of potential actions that
could be brought against the purchased claim," id at *2. The validity of these conclusions is now
in doubt after the district court reversed the bankruptcy court on the first one on the strangely
formalistic ground that the transfers at issue were sales instead of assignments. See In re Enron
Corp, No 01-16034, slip op at 30-38 (SDNY, Aug 27,2007).
127 Mabey, Legal Consequences at 54-55 n 47 (cited in note 16).
128 Paris, How to Draftfor CorporateFinance § 23:5:5 at 23-35 (cited in note 124) (arguing
that it may make sense to have a general on top of the wall making sure the firm as a whole is
acting rationally).
It may not be clear that making a firm look foolish when it potentially cheats the bankruptcy
system is necessarily a bad thing. After all, why should allowing firms to save face weigh in the
calculus? But it is not just a matter of saving face. A firm might look foolish because it pursues
investment strategies that it would never pursue if the committee members could tell the traders
what they know. This is a natural cost of the Chinese Wall, on the one hand, and of insider trading laws, on the other. But if the Chinese Wall is unnecessary and a defense to the insider trading
liability is available, then the firm can benefit from this information and avoid what are avoidable losses to investors, whether the firm's own in-house investment portfolio or the investments
of outside customers or fund participants.
125
126
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doesn't know what the left hand is doing. ' ' ' . Also, some hedge funds
may be too small to erect an effective Chinese Wall. Hedge funds have
become active players in the distressed-debt market and in claims
trading, so this may be an important problem."'
B.

Big Boy Trading

The advent of big boy letters may be able to fill in some of these
gaps in the protection provided by Chinese Walls in ways that courts
and commentators have yet to appreciate. To be sure, big boy letters
cannot replace Chinese Walls completely; the latter address fiduciary
liability and big boy letters never can. But in certain circumstances
these increasingly common agreements may be able to hone in on the
core insider trading liability that Chinese Walls cannot handle. In addition, the use of big boy letters illustrates that Chinese Walls are not
always necessary. When liability is more likely to arise from the other
party to an inside trade, the situation does not necessarily call for a
Chinese Wall.
A simple case will illustrate what big boy letters do. Imagine that
a creditor holds some claims against a debtor. This creditor has some
inside information that suggests that the claims he holds will go down
in value. The insider creditor wants to sell and approaches another
creditor with the claims. Concerned about insider trading liability (say
the seller has some preexisting relationship with the purchaser that
might put him under a duty to disclose), the insider offers to sell some
of his claims pursuant to a big boy letter. "1 Note that the second creditor, of course, may also have material nonpublic information of his
own that makes him want to buy. This other creditor is sophisticated
enough to understand the arrangement, and he agrees to accept the
risk. The parties consummate the big boy trade, each betting on the efficacy of his own information in determining the value of the claim. " '
What has the big boy letter done? The agreements "are designed
to limit an insider's liability under both securities laws and [the] common law,'' . so they should apply equally to securities and to claims.
Id.
See Fisher and Buck, 25 Am Bankr Inst J at 88 (cited in note 115).
131 For some of the representations typical of a big boy letter, see note 21.
132 The example should not change if the roles of buyer and seller here are reversed (and
indeed, the suggestion here is that both parties might be insiders). But see Mason and Pessin,
Legal Issues in Claims Trading at 17 (cited in note 9) (pointing out that "there is a strong argument to be made" that if the buyer has greater information, the law should not protect the seller
at all, regardless of whether or not there is a big boy letter).
133 Wendell H. Adair and Brett Lawrence, Big Boy Letters: Playing It Safe after O'Hagan, 17
J Corp Renewal 1, 1 (2004). For a view of big boy letters in another context-as a future nondisclosure agreement committing one party to sell stock conditional on seller behavior to another,
129
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Both 10b-5 and common law fraud require a showing of reliance on
the part of the aggrieved party. The primary function of the big boy
letter is to rebut conclusively any such showing because it expressly
declares that the noninsider is not relying on any representations that
the letter does not expressly contain.
There is as yet little case law on big boy letters in securities trades
and none on big boy letters in claims trades, primarily because they
are so new. But despite their novelty, big boy language now appears in

most securities trades that are not on a public exchange and in almost
all claims trades." ' Because the treatment of big boy letters involving
both securities and claims should be roughly parallel, the securities
cases should provide meaningful guidance to the use of big boy letters

in claims trading.
Against a background of cases honoring contracts releasing
claims in 10b-5 cases, the Second Circuit held in Harsco v Segui"3 ' that
"parties who negotiate at arm's length for the sale and purchase of a
business can define the transaction in a writing so as to preclude a
claim of fraud based on representations not made, and explicitly disclaimed, in that writing."' The plaintiff in that case had bought the

stock of an operating company pursuant to a lengthy document, with
extensive representations as well as language now associated with big
boy letters.'37 Both parties were sophisticated and well represented,

and they negotiated at arm's length. ' - Unlike a trade pursuant to a
typical big boy letter, however, the agreement at issue in Harsco contained far more extensive and specific representations and warranties
than the shorter big boy letter would, and provided the plaintiff with
more remedies than a big boy letter would supply.3 9 All the same, Harwithout the buyer's disclosing its inside information-see M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing
Duff & Phelps, 74 U Chi L Rev 1739, 1755-56 (2007).
134 The LSTA includes big boy language in its standard terms for distressed debt trading
documentation. See Loan Syndications and Trading Association, User's Guide for LSTA Distressed Debt Trading Documentation § IV.C.2.b.20 at 19-20 (cited in note 21).

91 F3d 337 (2d Cir 1996).
Id at 339 (affirming a dismissal of fraud claims against a business that allegedly inflated
its value in representations to a purchaser), quoted in Stephen R. Hertz, Do Big Boy Letters Really
Work?, 3 Debevoise & Plimpton Priv Eq Rep 5, 20 (2003), online at http://www.debevoise.com/
files/Publication/2736c2ae-9f14-4dee-b653-982519a39acl/PresentationlPublicationAttachment/aa
138944-92c4-4eef-8a6e-d30d0532e511/Spring%202003.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (concluding that
Harscoand other cases notwithstanding, it is not certain that big boy waivers would be enforced).
137 See Harsco,91 F3d at 340-41.
135
136

138

Id.

Hertz, 3 Debevoise & Plimpton Priv Eq Rep at 21 (cited in note 136) (drawing another
distinction between Harsco and big boy letters-that big boy letters are typically done with little
due diligence before signing). One might wonder why parties do not simply use Harsco-style
agreements instead of big boy letters. One reason is that the agreement in Harsco was both more
particularized and more generous than big boy traders would like. Big boy letters have become
boilerplate in claims trades, whereas the document in Harsco was designed more specifically for the
139
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sco and other cases argue for the enforceability of the waiver and
nonreliance provisions essential to big boy letters.""
The difficulty in 10b-5 cases specifically-a difficulty that would
not appear in a claims case-derives from § 29(a) of the Exchange
Act, " ' the so-called "antiwaiver provision." Under the statute, "[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder ... shall be void.. ' ..2 Harsco is part of a live split among
federal courts regarding whether this provision invalidates the waiver
and nonreliance clauses that constitute part of the core protections of
big boy letters."' One should not make too much of the dispute, however; even the AES Corp v Down Chemical Co" court, which found

that § 29(a) precludes the clauses from barring 10b-5 claims as a matter of law, still viewed them as evidence that the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the statements of the inside trader. "5
Because the § 29(a) problem is specific to the securities laws, it
poses no obstacle to big boy claims trades." The important implicaagreement in that case. See 91 F3d at 340. Big boy traders are also unlikely to want the remedies
that the contract in Harsco contained. See id (finding that the contract allowed the termination of
the deal during the diligence period if the buyer learned that any representations were false).
140 See, for example, McCormick v FundAmerican Companies,Inc, 26 F3d 869, 880 (9th Cir
1994) (holding that nondisclosure of material information was not actionable because plaintiff
knew of the nondisclosure); Jensen v Kimble, 1 F3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir 1993) (holding that
omissions were not actionable where the buyer advised the seller of the buyer's nondisclosures).
141 15 USC § 78cc (2000).
142 15 USC § 78cc(a).
143 Compare AES Corp v Dow Chemical Co, 325 F3d 174, 180 (3d Cir 2003) (holding that
§ 29(a) does invalidate such clauses); Rogen v Ilikon Corp, 361 F2d 260, 268 (1st Cir 1966) (same),
with Rissman v Rissman, 213 F3d 381, 387 (7th Cir 2000) (holding, without considering § 29(a),
that nonreliance clauses are valid); Harsco, 91 F3d at 343 (holding that, notwithstanding § 29(a),
nonreliance clauses are valid).
144 325 F3d 174 (3d Cir 2003).
145 Id at 180 (explaining that, while the provisions are evidence of nonreliance, it would
eviscerate § 29(a) if they were the basis for finding nonreliance as a matter of law). See also
Hertz, 3 Debevoise & Plimpton Priv Eq Rep at 7 (cited in note 136) (observing that the decision
does not seriously undermine big boy letters because of their remaining evidentiary value for the
reasonable reliance elemcnt).
146 There are two ways to understand this fact with implications for the question, unexplored here, of why the securities law has an antiwaiver provision in the first place. A more limited view would be that because the parties to big boy trades in bankruptcy are usually sophisticated, they do not need the benefit of such a provision. That is, the only parties that use big boy
language in claims trades are sufficiently aware of the risks they take with their trades that the
courts can trust them with their decision to waive without overriding it. A more expansive view,
however, would be that the usefulness of big boy letters, even when less sophisticated parties are
involved, see notes 151-54 and accompanying text, argues against there being any antiwaiver
provision at all in the securities law. Although the tendency here is to the more expansive view,
more needs to be done on this important ancillary question.
As a matter of law, § 29(a) does not apply to big boy claims trading; and even if it did, it
would not erase the evidentiary capacity of nonreliance language to defeat the presumption of
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tion of these cases is that outside of the § 29(a) problem, big boy letters do preclude any liability arising from the relationship between the
insider and his trading partner-the core insider trading liability as
distinguished from fiduciary liability.' 7 Big boy letters ensure that
both parties to the trade understand the risks. This addresses the advantage-taking that was the third concern of the bankruptcy remedies
and the harm that animates insider trading liability."'
C.

Combining Big Boys and Chinese Walls

The simple case described above suggests how big boy letters and
Chinese Walls could complement each other. Despite their use by
creditors on committees, big boy letters cannot immunize traders from
liability for breaching their fiduciary duties to their constituent credireliance. Practically speaking, the only bite § 29(a) has is to make motions to dismiss a bit harder,
forcing some defendants to wait until summary judgment.
147 See Part III. This does not mean, however, that big boy letters preclude liability where
the buyer in a big boy trade immediately resells the claim or security to another buyer without a
big boy letter. Several "downstream" buyers have brought suit in such cases, but the most highprofile case settled before it could produce an opinion. There remains, therefore, great uncertainty as to how courts will treat this issue. See generally Jenny Anderson, Side Deals in a Gray
Area, NY Times C1 (May 22, 2007). Nor is it clear how the SEC will react to big boy letters. The
Commission muddied the waters recently by pursuing a civil action against Barclays for insider
trading in several instances, some of which involved big boy letters. The SEC settled, however,
and the settlement agreement does not provide much guidance on the position the Commission
will take on big boy letters as such. See SEC v Barclays Bank PLC, Litigation Release No 20132
(May 30, 2007), online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20132.htm (visited Jan
12, 2008) (mentioning only that Barclays used big boy letters in some of the deals at issue). See
also Karl Groskaufmanis, Revisiting Insider Trading in the Debt Markets: Lessons for Debt Investors and Members of Committees in Bankruptcy Cases (2007), online at http://www.mondaq.co.ukl
article.asp?articleid=49536 (visited Jan 12, 2008) (registration required) (concluding that the
SEC did not defer to Barclay's big boy letters in any way).
148 Also, in a case where the insider receives his information from the debtor, he may also
require the debtor's approval of his intent to trade or risk breaching his fiduciary duty under the
misappropriation theory in United States v O'Hagan, 521 US 642, 652-53 (1997) (expanding
insider trading liability to include a "misappropriation" theory under which, even if he has no
duty to the party with whom he trades, an insider with a fiduciary duty to his information's
source can be liable to that source). As long as the information is not disclosed or used against
the firm or its shareholders, the debtor probably would not object and the disclosure of intent to
trade should relieve the insider at least of misappropriation liability or other fiduciary liability
under either the securities laws or state corporate law. Indeed, O'Haganitself required even less,
for the decision implied that a "trader in possession of material, nonpublic information could
avoid liability under misappropriation theory by disclosing his intention to trade to the information provider without actually disclosing to the trading counterparty the nonpublic information."
Adair and Lawrence, 17 J Corp Renewal at 1 (cited in note 133). See also O'Hagan, 521 US at
654. In other words, even though a committee member forgoes the Chinese Wall, when he trades
pursuant to a big boy letter he can still avoid breaching his duty of confidentiality to the debtor,
which was one of the core concerns of the bankruptcy courts. Note that regardless of the O'Hagan
language, common sense suggests he should still get the debtor's approval of his trade if the debtor
was the source of the inside information. After all, telling someone you intend to take his information without his consent is just as much theft as if you stole it without such "disclosure."
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tors. But remember the core concerns animating the bankruptcy
remedies: manipulation of the reorganization process, the abuse of
confidential information of the debtor, and investors taking advantage
of unsophisticated claims holders. The Papercraft cases paradigmatically illustrate how the harms claims trading jurisprudence seeks to
prevent revolve around these concerns."'
Chinese Walls are well suited to guard against claims trading that
might harm the constituent creditors by interfering with the reorganization process-a potential fiduciary violation. The traders in a given
financial firm are unable to drive the activities of the firm's representatives on the committee because the trading order bars committee
representatives from communicating with their counterparts over the
Wall. For the same reason, Chinese Walls may also help, in certain circumstances, to protect against breaches of the creditor's confidentiality duties to the debtor for the same reason.
But if the creditor merely wants to speculate in the claims during the
Chapter 11 case and this speculation will not interfere with its activities
in the reorganization, courts ought to find big boy letters sufficient.'"
The third concern of the bankruptcy courts, that unsophisticated
sellers (or buyers, for that matter) might be hurt, is something that big
boy letters are designed to fix. Big boy letters usually involve sophisticated parties, so in that sense an unsophisticated claims trader would
not even be in the picture. But the greater phenomenon of big boy
trading should also end up helping the unsophisticated creditor, not
just ignoring him. As numerous critics of insider trading laws have
argued for years, when insiders trade they inject information into the
market.'5 ' This influx of information ultimately helps even the smalltime participant in the market because prices better reflect all the in5 In addition, as long as insiders
formation that relevant parties know."'
disclose their identities, even unsophisticated parties can factor the

See notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
As noted above, disclosure to and approval of the debtor and even the creditors' committee of the insider's intent to trade should avoid the remnant of misappropriation liability. One
early commentary on Chinese Walls in bankruptcy suggested that disclosure to the committee
would suffice to allow a creditor on a committee to trade in the debtor's claims. Pozen and
Mencher, 28 Bus L at 754 (cited in note 63). This Comment takes the somewhat different position that a big boy letter containing the approval or consent of the source of the information
should preclude most liability.
151 See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of CorporateLaw at
294 (cited in note 40) (arguing that the price conveys information about the firm more effectively than disclosure when insiders are allowed to trade).
152 See id at 297-98 (arguing that this helps unsophisticated parties because they can free
ride on the search costs of others).
149
150
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risk that the insider has material, nonpublic information into the price
of any trade they make with an insider."'
These are standard arguments in the larger debate about insider
trading and Rule 10b-5, of course, and this Comment sympathizes with
the critics of the federal regulations.'m Yet in the context of claims
trading the critiques have particular strength. Because few parties participate in it and it remains somewhat novel, the market in claims
could benefit especially from the modification in prices that insider
trading would cause. In other words, there is less information available
and so the supply, even implicitly, of information that insider trading
provides becomes more valuable. Also, commentators frequently
worry that unsophisticated creditors lack the expertise to make sound
judgments about offers to buy their claims. ' If that is so, the creditors
know their own ignorance and therefore the idea discussed above
about the risk of inside information itself factoring into the price of a
trade resonates strongly.
There are further potential side benefits to big boy transactions.
Big boy trades increase liquidity in the claims markets, which provides
153 See Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading:Rule IOb-5, Disclosureand CorporatePrivacy, 9 J
Legal Stud 801,804 (1980) (suggesting that one theory for inside information disclosure is that it
disseminates knowledge so that all investors can make better informed judgments). See also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics 595 (Foundation 2002) (noting that
because on impersonal exchanges the seller would still sell absent the insider, unsophisticated
parties are hurt by the lack of disclosure, such as the fact that an insider is on the market).
154 This debate is voluminous. The seminal work critiquing securities regulation remains
Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 47-110 (Free 1966). For a small sampling of the
contemporary debate, compare Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99
Colum L Rev 1491, 1497 (1999) (arguing that Rule 10b-5 should not be used to regulate information disparities when it is aimed at preventing deception); Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic
Structure of CorporateLaw at 253-314 (cited in note 40) (arguing that the market should regulate
insider trading and disclosure rules); David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model
of Insider Trading, 80 Nw U L Rev 1449, 1451 (1986) (arguing that shareholders would normally
permit insider trading in exchange for paying lower wages in a Coasian world); Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan L Rev 857, 894 (1983)
(arguing that federal regulations are broader than those firms would negotiate privately and regulation should be left to private parties), with Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for
ProhibitingInsider Trading, 10 Ga St U L Rev 297, 298 (1994) (arguing that economic theory and
evidence contradicts Manne's conclusion that insider trading promotes market efficiency); Gary
Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading,11 Harv J L & Pub Policy at 727 (1988) (outlining the nor.mative foundation for condemning insider trading under a property rights view); James D. Cox,
Insider Trading and Contracting:A CriticalResponse to the "Chicago School," 1986 Duke L J 628,
655-57 (arguing that the current law is the correct policy and overcomes collective action and
information asymmetry problems); Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the
Internal Efficiency of the Modern Corporation,80 Mich L Rev 1051, 1053 (1982) (arguing that
prohibiting insider trading could enhance business decisionmaking in corporations).
155 See, for example, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 Harv L Rev 1197, 1216 (2005) ("Unsophisticated
creditors may voluntarily contract with a debtor for large or small amounts, but they lack the
expertise required to discover and evaluate differing bankruptcy terms.").
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a way for a creditor to opt out of a reorganization. A creditor may
want to opt out of a reorganization because it has information that the
debtor might fail or simply because it wants to put its money and energies elsewhere. Regardless, the creditor should be allowed to protect
itself from the bankruptcy remedies with a big boy letter. Just because
various factors in the reorganization might make one creditor nervous
does not mean another would not be willing to take its place or that
the other creditors in the process would want out as well. The same
applies to a creditor who wants to buy into the reorganization,
whether because it has information about the debtor's positive prospects or for some other reason. By hypothesis, the parties to the trade
accept the risk it involves. It would therefore be sensible for bankruptcy courts to let parties do that without fear of liability if they can
find a creditor who wants to sell its claims.
All of these considerations indicate that big boy letters and Chinese Walls may work well together both legally and practically, each
covering the gaps left by the other. Bankruptcy courts should adjust
their application of the claims trading remedies to adapt to the synergy of these two tools, just as they accommodated the use of Chinese
Walls individually. There may be situations where a Chinese Wall, contrary to the assumptions prevalent today, is not necessary as a defense
to the bankruptcy remedies as long as a creditor on the committee
trades pursuant to big boy letters and keeps the debtor (and perhaps
the constituent creditors) informed. For if the trader is content to let
the reorganization proceed without manipulating it, he should not find
himself under the scrutiny of bankruptcy courts concerned about the
integrity of that process. The big boy letter, for its part, prevents the
potential harms to trading partners that concern bankruptcy courts.
Finally, even though the trader may violate his duties to the constituent creditors in a formal sense, it is unclear how, if he does not cause
delay or interfere with the reorganization process, his speculative trading will harm them.%

156 Some commentators assert that when a fiduciary uses inside information for his own
gain he has, ipso facto, misused it. See, for example, Mark J. Krudys, Insider Trading by Members
of Creditors' Committees-Actionable!, 44 DePaul L Rev 99, 141-42 (1994). The Papercraft cases
suggest that the primary harms worrying the courts concern the reorganization process, the
debtor's confidential information, and unsophisticated parties. See notes 69-86 and accompanying text. Under Wolf v Weinstein, 372 US 633, 655 (1963), fiduciary liability is prophylactic and
does not require actual harm. This Comment takes the position that there should have to be
some harm to the creditors to whom the committee member is a fiduciary in order for insider
claims trading to be actionable.
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VI. SOME POTENTIAL LESSONS OF BIG BOY LETTERS
AND CHINESE WALLS FOR RULE 1OB-5

This Comment began with the background debate about whether
to apply the securities laws to bankruptcy claims. The current consensus that they do not apply requires that bankruptcy courts regulate
claims effectively in the absence of the securities laws. Parts III-V of
this Comment analyzed the law of insider trading and contemporary
investor behavior to evaluate the claims trading remedies. But the
resulting conclusion that bankruptcy courts and commentators have
been too quick to make the Chinese Wall the only defense to the
claims trading remedies suggests a line of inquiry beyond bankruptcy.
For the argument rests on the distinction between insider trading behavior on the one hand, and abusive behavior by a fiduciary on the
other, each the subject of either insider trading law or the law of fiduciary duties, respectively. This distinction underlies the different functions of big boy letters and Chinese Walls.
But securities law, principally but not only by widening the scope
of 10b-5 liability to anyone to whom the insider has a fiduciary duty, as
157 has conflated the two sources of liabilper United States v O'Hagan,
ity. This has brought securities law afield from its intended territoryto regulate the market in financial investments -and into the province
of state corporate law. This overregulation of instruments that are unarguably securities means that courts are more wary about defining
too many instruments as securities, even those that seem to be securities. Scholars reflect this wariness when they warn that the alternative
bankruptcy regime already covers the field and that applying the securities laws would impinge on the bankruptcy process. This Comment
considers only 10b-5, but, at least in this context, a narrowing of the
scope of 10b-5 would greatly reduce the potential awkwardness involved in applying it to bankruptcy claims.
The argument, then, suggests that to reestablish the distinction
between liability for fiduciary violations and insider trading would
allow 10b-5 to apply to the latter more cleanly. This idea is only a suggestion, of course, sketched out here to provide food for thought. But
such a result might be desirable because it would treat like investments alike, ensure that cases of truly objectionable insider trading in
bankruptcy receive the full brunt of the securities laws, and clear up
the confusion in claims trading jurisprudence.

157

521 US 642 (1997).
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CONCLUSION

Billions of dollars in claims trade in American bankruptcies, but
the legal regime governing these markets remains uncertain. Commentators have come to something of a standstill about whether or
not to apply the securities laws to claims trading. If one focuses on
potential insider trading in claims, one can approach the problem with
an eye fixed firmly on contemporary investor behavior. From this
largely unexplored perspective, it appears that big boy letters can and
should play a more important role in the scheme of regulation that

bankruptcy courts apply to claims trading. Courts and commentators
have assumed that Chinese Walls are the only way for creditors on
committees to trade without liability under the claims trading remedies." But if a creditor on a creditors' committee trades pursuant to a
big boy letter, in certain situations bankruptcy courts ought not to impose their remedies, even without a Chinese Wall. In other words,
courts should allow big boy letters to act as a separate defense to liability. The reason is that these two tools-big boy letters and Chinese
Walls -fulfill different functions and prevent different harms. The di-

chotomy between them reflects a fundamental difference between
two theories of liability in this area of the law: fiduciary duty liability
and insider trading liability proper. If the bankruptcy remedies adapt
to reflect this difference, they would furnish a powerful alternative to
the regulation of insider trading under the securities laws. This might

either justify the reluctance of courts to apply those laws to claims
trading or encourage amendment of Rule 10b-5 to similarly reflect the
difference. "9

This argument turns on the basic recognition that core insider
trading and fiduciary duties involve two distinct areas of law generat158

For a typical statement of the current consensus, see Fisher and Buck, Hedge Funds and

the ChangingFace of Corporate Bankruptcy Practice,25 Am Bankr Inst J at 87 n 5 (cited in note
115) ("[E]ntities sitting on official committees [with access to inside information] cannot trade
when in possession of such material, nonpublic information absent appropriate ethical screening
measures isolating employees sitting on the committee from those with trading authority.").
159 One arrives at this suggestion as a result of the basic structure of this Comment. That is,
under Reves as currently read, Rule 10b-5 does not apply to claims trading, partially because of
the existence of the bankruptcy remedies. One therefore considers how well these remedies do
in the absence of Rule 10b-5. In the bankruptcy remedies, the distinction between fiduciary and
insider trading liability becomes apparent, and apparently useful in light of targeted investor
tools like Chinese Walls and big boy letters. If one takes the importance of this distinction seriously, it seems that Rule 10b-5 itself might benefit from an amendment to reflect the distinction,
thus treating trading in claims and securities, which have similar dynamics, similarly. Whether or
not this might then make it easier to apply Rule 10b-5 to claims trading is another question,
touched on briefly at the end of this Comment. Both possibilities result from the recognition of
the importance of a distinction that the securities laws have elided, namely that between fiduciary and insider trading liability.
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ing two distinct theories of liability. Chinese Walls and big boy letters
preclude liability based on these two distinct theories: violations of
fiduciary duty and unlawful insider trading, respectively. On the one
hand, many of the bankruptcy remedies, as the Papercraft cases illustrate, 1 ° seek to remedy, in the bankruptcy context, instances of selfdealing, the quintessential violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Chinese Walls are just an ex ante, prophylactic solution to the same
problem. The conduct they are designed to prevent has no integral
connection to insider trading and is the subject of garden variety corporate law claims usually heard in state courts. On the other hand, big
boy letters ensure that the insider has not deceived the party with
whom he trades by means of his inside information. The parties recognize the possibility of inside information and agree to accept the
risk. The big boy letter therefore addresses the core concern of insider
trading law, from its common law antecedents to today's Rule 10b-5.
Bankruptcy claims trading jurisprudence retains a glimmer of this
distinction and bankruptcy courts might brighten it. From the hostile
takeover to the poison pill, the law governing American business has
evolved in the back and forth of judicial remedies, sanctions, and private innovations. Taking stock of another pair of innovations-big boy
letters and Chinese Walls-helps to determine how bankruptcy courts
should develop their ex post remedies to allow for these ex ante prophylactic tools. The model thus established seems to compare well to
the regime currently governing insider trading in securities.

160

See notes 69-86 and accompanying text.

